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D I A L O G U E

Green Finance: Leveraging
Investment for Environmental
Protection
Summary
Some political narratives describe the relationship between
environmental protection and economic growth as two
inherently incompatible goals. As the global community
turns its attention to implementing international climate
agreements, this story is ceding ground to the realization
that the economy must facilitate a transition to sustainability. With limited government funding available, private
investments offer an opportunity to dramatically increase
and leverage funding to address daunting environmental
problems. Green financing will play a critical role in the
shift to a green economy.
Governments,
intergovernmental
organizations,
financial institutions, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are examining green financing mechanisms in earnest. Financial institutions are
enabling investment in green infrastructure, and many
have signed on to the Equator Principles, a risk management framework for determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risk in projects. NGOs and
governments are promoting public policies that encourage investments in sustainability, and developing public
and private mechanisms to facilitate investments in environmentally beneficial projects, such as the Paris Climate
Agreement's Green Climate Fund. With targets including
pollution control, biodiversity protection, and materials
management, as well as investments directly related to
decreasing reliance on fossil fuels, the impacts of green
financing could reshape the landscape for environmental
professions. On June 6, 2017, ELI held a public seminar to
present recent developments in this field. Below we present a transcript of the discussion, which has been edited
for style, clarity, and space considerations.
Michael Gerrard (moderator) is Director of the Sabin
Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.
Charles E. Di Leva is a Visiting Scholar at the Environmental
Law Institute.
John Rousakis is Counsel for O’Melveny & Myers LLP.
Douglass Sims is Director of Strategy & Finance at the
Natural Resources Defense Council’s Center for Market
Innovation.
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Michael Gerrard: As is going to become abundantly clear,
there is no one standard definition of “green finance” in
terms of what’s included or not. So, I’m going to talk about
finance that is directly related to climate change mitigation
and adaptation. In particular, what is it that will ultimately
need to be paid for?
And so, of course, we start with mitigation and greenhouse gas emissions reductions—which is mostly migrating away from fossil fuels. That involves efforts to minimize
energy use through a number of energy-efficiency measures, and efforts to decarbonize the electric power supply
to move from fossil fuels toward clean sources of electricity like wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, and possibly
nuclear—although that’s a different debate. It also involves
electrifying the vehicle fleet and converting space heating,
space cooling, and water heating away from fossil fuels to
electricity. All of that means that we essentially need to
eventually double the supply of electricity, and all of the
electricity needs to come from clean sources. Doing that
will be enormously expensive. That is one of the important
elements of green finance, paying for this massive decarbonization effort.
We also know that even if we were making our best
efforts, there would be a lot of climate change happening.
Therefore, a lot of adaptation would be needed. That’s coping with the unstoppable climate change that will occur.
An enormous number of activities will be needed to protect properties that are vulnerable to coastal hazards and
to other climate-related problems, for example by putting
buildings on stilts or retreating from the coastline or a variety of other methods that are needed for adaptation. In
many parts of the country, the water supply system will
need to be reconfigured. Many agricultural systems are
going to need to be changed. Lots of other things are going
to have to be done as well.
Not included in any of these are losses that will occur
as a result of property destruction and lost productivity
from climate change. But this is not monetized. It’s not
subject to green finance because really nobody pays for it,
except sometimes insurance companies. Otherwise, these
are just economic losses. In the ideal world, we, the developed world, would also be helping the developing countries cope with the losses that they will inevitably suffer as
a result of climate change due largely to our greenhouse gas
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emissions. And then there’s the issue of what to do with the
unspeakably large number of people who will ultimately
be displaced.
None of this is conventionally thought of as a subject
of green finance. But these are, in fact, costs that will be
incurred by society. We know that the Paris Agreement
essentially called for a complete transition away from fossil
fuels. President Donald Trump is backing away from Paris,
but the rest of the world is staying there. Hopefully, one
day, the United States will return to the overall agreement
and to this idea.
How much will all of this cost? There’s no consensus
on this. But a couple of figures will give you a sense of the
number of zeroes involved. An important 2015 report by
the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project1 indicated a
whole range of costs for the United States. But the central
estimate of the cost for the United States would be in 2050,
$320 billion, and ramping up to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars each year for the next several decades—all
for this massive project to decarbonize the energy system.
Prof. Geoffrey Heal at Columbia Business School is
using a set of different assumptions and definitions.2 He
had a somewhat lower estimate. But overall, we’re talking
about hundreds of billions of dollars per year. This does not
count fossil fuel cost savings. The more we move away from
fossil fuels, then the less we’ll have to spend on fossil fuels,
obviously. So, that is a massive offset that is not included
in these numbers.
Bloomberg New Energy Finance has come up with some
global estimates.3 For each five-year period, they compare what would be needed under a continuation of the
business-as-usual scenario. Even under a business-as-usual
scenario, you have a lot of clean energy, a lot of wind and
solar being built. But then if we ramp up to a two-degree
pathway, we see higher numbers. So, for these five-year
increments going out to 2040, for each one, we have up
to $4.4 trillion over the course of five years. Thus, there’s
a lot of money that is going to be necessary. Bloomberg
New Energy Finance has also estimated what portion of
these expenditures will be used for what (e.g., solar, wind,
biomass, and geothermal).
In terms of adaptation, again, this is not generally considered part of green finance, but it will have real costs.
There are no good estimates for what these costs will be.
But it’s likely in the high tens or hundreds of billions of
dollars per year, just for the United States for adaptation
to climate change. In terms of global adaptation cost, the
United Nations Environment Programme each year issues
an adaptation finance gap report,4 which includes estimates
1.
2.
3.
4.

Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, Pathways to Deep Decarbonization (2015), available at http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/DDPP_2015_REPORT.pdf.
Geoffrey Heal, What Would It Take to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 80% by 2050?, Working Paper 22525, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Aug. 2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22525.pdf.
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, New Energy Outlook 2017, https://
about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/#toc-download.
United Nations Environment Programme, ǲF"EBQUBUJPO(BQ3FQPSUT,
http://web.unep.org/adaptationgapreport/content/adaptation-gap-reports
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for the annual costs for adaptation in the developing world.
This is just for the developing world, not the developed
world, so this is on top of the cost that would be incurred
by the United States and Canada and Europe and so forth.
The ranges, again, are in the hundreds of billions of dollars
per year out to 2050. In 2050, it doesn’t stop. It keeps getting worse—and how much worse depends on the success
we have in controlling temperatures.
In terms of what the actual economic costs would be,
an important study headed by Tom Steyer and Michael
Bloomberg and others had some very, very high estimates
of what the economic cost would be just in the United
States in the years to come as a result of climate change.5
All of this adds up to an enormous financial burden that
we’ll have to figure out how to pay for.
Joining us first is Charles Di Leva, a visiting scholar with
the Environmental Law Institute. He retired as chief counsel for the Environmental and International Law Practice
Group at the World Bank, where he advised on operational
and policy matters related to sustainable development and
climate change and its related roles and responsibilities.
He’s also an adjunct professor at both American University
Washington College of Law and George Washington University Law School.
Charles Di Leva: Following on what Professor Gerrard has
laid out as the scope and scale of the challenge, I will talk
about some ways we might be able to help deal with this
massive financial challenge by promoting green finance.
As Mike mentioned, there are different definitions and,
depending on where you’re acting, you may be using different sources of funding for dealing with climate or dealing
with issues of gender support or indigenous communities
or other kinds of biodiversity-related issues. There is sometimes an importance to the nuance in terms of the terminology we’re using.
I want to talk about various incentives that help make
finance green: rules, regulations, and guidance. They don’t
really fall into hard-and-fast binding and nonbinding categories. Depending on how you look at what I’ll describe,
there may be something that we’d look at as typically binding legislation, or there may be various incentives that can
be what we’d call soft or guidance terminology. I’ll look at
some of the risks that can help promote green finance, and
then some of the reputational issues as well.
On the harder binding requirements that incentivize
green finance, I think, despite the U.S. pullout, we can
look at the example of the Paris Agreement. Even though
it’s been in the news that the United States’ nationally
determined contribution (NDC) was not legally binding,
when one looks at the 160+ NDCs that were submitted
by the Paris Agreement, it’s true in the context of Paris
that governments can change. But beneath that is the fact
that within many of those NDCs there already are binding

5.

(last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
The Bottom Line on Climate Change, Risky Business, https://riskybusiness.
org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
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commitments that will drive green finance. Mexico had
already adopted a climate change law. China has put in
place emission trading systems. Look at what California
has done. Also, carbon pricing schemes, something that
the World Bank has been working very hard to promote,
are witnessed in the legally binding price regimes that you
see, for example, in some of the major Canadian provinces—Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario.
Then, when it comes to large international financial
institutions, the multilateral institutions such as the World
Bank and other development banks like the new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, their criteria require impact
assessments to look at greenhouse gas emissions and to try
to reduce the emissions to the extent feasible.
In addition, there are other reporting requirements that
are binding. There’s a European Union (EU) directive on
nonfinancial reporting that captures climate-related risks
and programs of what are called “large companies” in the
EU scheme—those that have more than 500 employees.6
It’s interesting to see that the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges are also requiring climate reporting. We
still have Regulation S-K in the United States for environmental disclosure, which is a requisite under the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.7 It’s interesting to
look at some of the new trade agreements and how they
are specifically trying to protect climate regulation against
claims by investors that new climate regulation could be
seen as direct or indirect expropriation. All of these things
are increasing leverage for climate requirements.
There’s also a growing body of guidance or voluntary
pledges that will make climate finance visible and part
of the investment scheme. For example, Mike mentioned
Mayor Bloomberg, who was the head of the Task Force on
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures that was launched
by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB consists
of all of the world’s central banks. All of their governors
decided that it was needed to have a way to provide them
with recommendations on climate disclosure. There is a
new technical bulletin on climate risks issued by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB).8 And
then there are some major programs and projects and initiatives like the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), CDP
(formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project), and the Climate
Registry.9 These will all track climate investments, climate
programs, and climate emissions.
There are many other risks that drive finance to become
green, including the growing volume of climate litigation
all over the world. Many of us are aware of some cases in
6.

7.
8.
9.

Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure
of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings
and Groups (L 330/1).
17 C.F.R. §229.19 (1982).
SASB, Climate Risk—Technical Bulletin, https://library.sasb.org/climate-risk-technical-bulletin/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar.
26, 2018); CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en (last visited Mar. 26, 2018); The
Climate Registry, https://www.theclimateregistry.org/ (last visited Mar.
26, 2018).
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the United States. But there are also some very high-visibility cases that Sabin Center has tracked in India and the
Netherlands and other parts of the world that will help
drive financial investments to look at the risks associated
with not being climate-friendly.
Technologically, the World Bank has pointed out for
many years that if there’s deep investment in fossil fuels,
there’s the risk that these may become stranded assets over
time. We see it today in the large fluctuating prices that are
associated with various forms of fossil fuel that are more
unstable than what one sees today very often in solar and
wind. And there is the risk that environmental law, environmental regulations, are going to increasingly tighten
carbon dioxide-type emissions. Then, of course, from the
social standpoint, there is the possibility of boycotts to
challenge fossil fuel-related investment.
Reputationally as well, the issue of a carbon footprint
is almost a standard topic for major corporations today.
Recently, there was the announcement by Walmart that
they would launch an initiative to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by one gigaton by 2030.10 They enlist their major
suppliers in the initiative. Therefore, some household names
around the country will be participating in the tracking of
greenhouse gases to reduce the amount of emissions and to
enhance their reputations. Again, these initiatives are not
legally binding on these entities, but they see it as necessary
for customer reputational issues.
Shareholders as well are becoming increasingly involved
in looking at climate impacts. And then from a regulatory
and policy standpoint, of course, all of those present in
Paris are aware of the fact that they need to look at how
they are currently devoting national resources. Is there still
too much being subsidized on the fossil fuel side as opposed
to solar and wind? The Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development’s (OECD’s) statistics indicate
that indeed that is the case still today.11
The Green Climate Fund was first really identified in
2009 by President Barack Obama and then-Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. Today, the donors who many of us
may have been counting on to support green finance are
also caught up in the humanitarian crises that one sees in
North Africa and Somalia and Syria, and that makes it all
the more important to move away from harmful subsidies
and to use the scarce public resources that we do have to try
to de-risk renewable energy investment.
That is something that, I think, all of the multilateral
development banks have been trying to do. It’s interesting
to see that the new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
has developed an energy plan that is very much in line with
the World Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan,12 to really
10. 8BMNBSU-BVODIFT1SPKFDU(JHBUPOUP3FEVDF&NJTTJPOTJO$PNQBOZT4VQQMZ
Chain, Walmart (Apr. 19, 2017), https://news.walmart.com/2017/04/19/
walmart-launches-project-gigaton-to-reduce-emissions-in-companys-supply-chain.
11. OECD, http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
12. World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan (2016), available at
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/677331460056382875/WBG-ClimateChange-Action-Plan-public-version.pdf.
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use their resources to promote as much as possible renewable energy investment in their own targets that they have
been setting. As well, all of them are advocating proper
pricing of environmental goods and services, looking at
including a social cost of carbon, which, of course, the
Trump executive order removed from the U.S. calculation,
but that still exists, and I think that is the way most multilateral financial institutions are looking at it.
And then perhaps the latest news of the day dealing
with this are the very interesting shareholder climate initiatives, in which it’s at least reported that Exxon had opposed
a climate shareholder initiative to report on climate risk
and climate disclosure that then prevailed by a 62% vote.13
While it may be nonbinding, it’s interesting to see the large
actors that have been supporting this kind of initiative,
such as BlackRock Investment and some of the major U.S.
pension funds.
Michael Gerrard: Thank you very much, Charles. We’re
now going to hear from Douglass Sims, who’s an attorney
with the Natural Resources Defense Council as Director
of Strategy and Finance in their Center for Market Innovation. He works on a wide range of issues related to renewable energy deployment in the United States and abroad.
Douglass Sims: There was a good setup by Charles on
the importance of leveraging limited public capital to
drive investment in what we call low-carbon and resilient infrastructure, which includes energy and adaptation
infrastructure. One concept that I’ve worked on for several years is the green investment bank (GIB). We’re going
to focus on that. The Green Bank Network is a group of
green banks that have gotten together to help expand best
practices around the world in green banking and also to
help new green banks form. We think this institution or
this function is key to accelerating investments not just in
India, but everywhere.
So, we’ve heard the setup about the costs of the transition from fossil fuels to clean energy. But I think the
important thing is to recognize that this requires a massive
shift in investment from business-as-usual to new kinds
of investments in resilience and in low-carbon infrastructure. This change requires a shift from not just centralized
energy, but distributed energy both in the United States
and in developed countries abroad. This is difficult because
distributed energy is something that is new and it’s small
and it’s a high transaction cost. So, it becomes a paradigm
shift both for market mechanisms and also finance. I mentioned resilience. It is necessary to build changes in coastlines but also water, agriculture, and a whole variety of
sectors, which aren’t necessarily thought of when we think
about climate change in the first instance.

13. Marianne Lavelle, &YYPO4IBSFIPMEFST"QQSPWF$MJNBUF3FTPMVUJPO7PUF
GPS%JTDMPTVSF, Inside Climate News (May 31, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/31052017/exxon-shareholder-climate-change-disclosureresolution-approved.
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Then, there’s this concept of “greening finance” versus
green finance. Greening finance we take to mean working with financial institutions and other investors to apply,
essentially, climate filters and climate mechanisms and
analysis to all their investments across the institutions. If
you look at a food investment, you need to think about the
supply of water and seeds and how it will be affected by
climate change. Green finance is a more limited category
that we term to mean investing in the infrastructure necessary to deal with climate change, energy, energy efficiency,
and adaptation.
So, the GIBs are a part of the solution. It’s a bit of a
misnomer. A GIB is not a bank. It doesn’t accept deposits like a bank does. It’s not regulated like a bank. But it’s
a specialized financing vehicle designed to crowd in private capital to these sectors.There’s a lot of interest in GIBs
around the world. There are GIBs in Asia, Europe, and
the United States. And there’s interesting momentum in
places like Canada, Chile, India, Mexico, the Philippines,
and Ukraine.
What is a GIB? Essentially, it’s a publicly capitalized
financial institution dedicated to increasing private investment in these sectors. It’s independent from government,
meaning that even though government sets up the conditions of its equities, it makes investment decisions based
on independent rigorous determinations of commercial
viability. Also, it’s got a narrow mandate. It only does green
investments, which allows it to specialize and get the right
kinds of people and resources. It’s focused on cost-effectiveness, which means that it has to demonstrate that its
investments will be, over time, replicable by the market
and will also result in value to the government. We’ve seen
a lot of this demonstrated in some of the early GIBs where,
initially, they were only being subsidized by governments.
And once the GIBs started entering into the system, there
were many more dollars invested per public dollar, many
more megawatts of energy, or negawatts, which is what
we call energy efficiency leading to energy generation for
a lesser cost.
Much like the multilateral development banks, transactions in which GIBs engage must be additional. They
must actually catalyze more investment as a condition to
investing. Not just maintain the status quo, but help deals
become cheaper for investors or less risky for investors.
There’s a focus on accountability, meaning reporting—
both financial, green, and other what we call environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, like jobs created.
These are designed to crowd in private capital—as opposed
to crowding out private capital. Crowding out private
capital occurs when the government takes an activity that
dominates the field and pushes away private investment;
conversely, “crowding in” means bringing in more capital.
Very importantly, GIBs are built to serve local policy
and market needs, be that at the retail or the wholesale
level. When we say retail, we mean essentially direct loans
or other interventions with end-users like homeowners
and businesses. By wholesale, we mean interventions at
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the financial institution level helping banks make more
loans or other kinds of investments. And very importantly,
the capital that comes in to the institutions needs to be
patient, meaning that it has a long horizon, longer than
the market would typically generate. Also, it has a different
kind of return expectation than the market will anticipate
in most cases.
The one question we often hear is, don’t GIBs duplicate
other institutions? The answer we give is no. There’s a wide
variety of institutions doing similar things—some of the
same things in the market—but they have some different
characteristics. Multilateral institutions and national development banks that are prominent public banks are really
on the landscape in most places around the world outside
of developed countries. These have broad mandates—antipoverty, electrification, all kinds of things—which are
developmental indicators that are very important but that
aren’t necessarily exclusive to green investments.
There are also quite large institutions and they deploy a
lot of capital, whereas the GIBs are relatively smaller. They
target things that are trying to crowd in private capital.
There are also some entities that are just public-sector lenders or financing authorities. Those entities essentially operate very similarly to their private counterparts that provide
loans. They don’t necessarily do transformative things that
share risks with the private sector to crowd them in.
Then there’s the private fund sector, which has the same
kind of expertise as GIBs. But essentially, that expertise is
focused on private ends of profit, not on market transformation. That gives them a role that is not as transformative
to the broader market. So, GIBs work with these institutions as well as utilities, banks, end-users of energy, equipment providers, contractors, and others to increase the flow
of capital and information to the market because information is what transforms the markets.
I mentioned earlier GIB-like entities, meaning entities
that do some of the things that GIBs do, but not all of these
entities operate globally. The ones that we work closely with
in the Green Bank Network are Connecticut Green Bank,
New York Green Bank, United Kingdom (U.K.) Green
Investment Bank, Japan Green Finance Organization,
Green Tech Malaysia, Clean Energy Finance Corporation
of Australia, and others that do some similar things. The
newest GIB is the Montgomery County Green Bank near
Washington, D.C., in Maryland. There’s some interesting
work being done in California at the iBank, which does
some transformative things. But their client base is publicsector entities.
I’ve been traveling recently, particularly in Asia, working with folks in the Philippines and India around this
concept. There’s a lot of interest in it. In emerging markets
in particular, there’s a niche that banks can fill. I should
point out that GIBs don’t exist in any emerging markets
right now other than in Malaysia. A paper14 about this was
released at the 22nd Conference of the Parties, which is an

annual climate event, and last year was in Morocco. There
are several areas where a GIB can make a difference.
First, earlier, we heard about NDCs. These are highlevel commitments in many cases. But they aren’t actually
translated into investible projects. So, GIBs can help countries actually move from concept to investment, working
with other actors in the market to help make those investible propositions.
Second, there’s a lot of activity going on and a lot of
players around how to deploy innovative tools to meet
these needs. Sometimes these are dispersed around a country or state, as in the case of the East Coast and New York
and Connecticut. GIBs can focus that activity in one institution to help innovation be demonstrated, tested, and
pushed out to the market in a centralized way. In emerging markets as well, as was mentioned earlier, there are a
lot of international climate funds being deployed, and they
need local partners. Those funds don’t always have access
to local knowledge. Having a GIB that’s built in understanding of local conditions will help them find opportunities and deploy their capital more efficiently. Similarly,
there can be a conduit function between international and
national parties, which we call upstream actors. Projectlevel downstream actors are contractors, homeowners, and
building owners that design green banks.
So, what’s the model in short? Different kinds of patient
capital come in to the GIB and different kinds of products
and tools get designed by the GIB to deal with specific
market needs and they get invested in projects. Sources of
capital include international investors, like the bond market, the green bond market, for example; private investors who want to invest in the space, philanthropy, and
impact investors; and public sources, meaning international donors, bilateral donors, and multilateral donors like
the Green Climate Fund. And, of course, the fundamental
capitalization of some GIBs is often done by public sources,
domestic budgets, or utility surcharges. Coming out of the
GIB is a bunch of products built on crowding in private
capital. But there is some straight co-lending, meaning
lending side-by-side with the private sector without any
kind of risk mitigation that has its value. Risk mitigation
and credit enhancement takes some of the risks off of these
investments to bring in new investors.
Aggregation, warehousing, and securitization—what
does this mean? That, of course, means taking small projects that by themselves are nonstandardized with the high
transaction cost, and putting them together in what’s
called the warehouse to give them scale. And then introducing them to the market in various formats. One format
is called securitization.
Also, there is innovative financing, things that are
needed to deal with specific problems and specific markets, whereas we have a market driven by tax credits. That’s
something that the GIBs can look at with appropriate and
local conditions and design specific solutions for those con-

14. Coalition for Green capital et al., Green & Resilience Banks: How
The Green Investment Bank Model Can Play a Role in Scaling Up

Climate Finance in Emerging Markets (2016), available at http://greenbanknetwork.org/portfolio/green-and-resilience-banks/.

Copyright © 2018 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

48 ELR 10372

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

ditions. And then there can be money that is not money
with returns, attached to grants that are deployed alongside
investment capital and debt to provide technical assistance
to contractors and banks to help them understand how
these markets and transactions work.
So, how are GIBs created? They can be created by law,
legislation, administrative action, and repurposing and
consolidating existing entities. In Australia, there was a new
legislative act passed by parliament. In Connecticut, there
was also a law passed. But as part of that law, the existing
entity that was a grantmaking entity was repurposed into
the Connecticut Green Bank. And in New York, the New
York Green Bank was formed through an administrative
action as part of, essentially, the vision of the New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority, which
is an existing entity in New York that had the capacity to
create subsidiaries and divisions within itself.
You can be capitalized in the industrialized countries
by budget funds, by cap and trade, by utility surcharges.
And then some forces have come in from emerging markets, national development banks or funds, international
sources, and different kinds of investors. So, this will touch
on the importance of the local specialization and local
design of these entities. They also have the similar mission
of crowding in private capital. But they also have particular
features designed for local climate policy goals.
In Australia, interestingly, there’s an emphasis on transforming into a more competitive economy in the green
economy, which means that, in practice, Australia doesn’t
just do commercial investments, but also does venture
investments, which actually allows them to take some
additional risks on new technologies that could help the
country gain an edge in the market. Malaysia is interested
in spreading green technology around the economy. These
programs are designed more to push out, to take some
risk on by the government, to get more investors involved,
particularly commercial banks in the sector. In Japan,
interestingly, there’s a very clear mandate to develop communities with some of these projects. That affects the kinds
of investments they make.
There are also similar types of missions in other GIBs.
The U.K. Green Investment Bank was the first GIB.
Recently, it was privatized through its sale to Macquarie,
which is an Australian bank. That was possible in some
respects because U.K. GIB’s focus has been to be green and
profitable. Unlike other green banks, the U.K. GIB always
strove to be at the same level of pricing and the same level
of operations as private banks, really preparing it for such a
privatization. So, the U.K. GIB’s focus wasn’t on providing
necessarily long-term patient capital, but on providing specific expertise in areas where other banks hadn’t invested.
Even though markets are different in terms of what they
need and what the focus is, there are some problems that
we know about that in every market tend to pose problems and on which the GIBs focus. One of those is that we
know how to do big projects, usually with prior purchase
agreements. But we don’t know how to do projects that are
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medium- and small-sized and are innovative. Typically in
every market there’s a focus on that. In the U.K., for example, offshore wind was a new and very large and expensive
area where they had to make progress. And they wanted to
satisfy their climate commitments. So, the U.K. GIB had a
mandate to do offshore wind.
Small and medium enterprise projects are hard. These
are projects where the so-called customers, the offtakers,
are smaller. They don’t have as much resources as larger
companies. There is a high cost of structuring, and we need
some special help in those areas too.
Distributed energy, as was already mentioned, is hard
to finance. Also energy efficiency, which is really hard to
finance, because basically you’re telling someone that if
they spend money now, they’ll save money later, and that
concept is very hard for a lot of actors to appreciate.
Some of the key strategies that GIBs use include credit
enhancement, where the GIB provides essentially an
insurance-type product to increase the attractiveness and
decrease the risk of projects; co-investment needs investing alongside of investors, lending expertise, reducing
some requirements for equity to raise more equity if you’re
making equity investments or debt; and then aggregation
and warehousing and securitization, which means making
small projects, adding them up, and then pushing them up
to the market as a portfolio.
So, how do you measure the success of GIBs? There’s
this really important concept of leverage. That means,
how much money do you bring into a particular transaction with the public money that you’re utilizing? In other
words, leverage ratio. If it’s 2:1, it means you have twice as
much money coming in from the private sector. If it’s 10:1,
you have 10 times as much money coming in. This is an
important metric. But leverage isn’t the only metric.
The metric that GIBs focus on is really something called
market transformation, which is harder to measure. Market transformation occurs not in your transaction, but after
your transaction. It’s how the market responds without the
GIB intervention and how fast. It’s hard to measure. This
is something that is being studied by both GIBs and multilateral developmental banks and others. How do you measure market transformation? The approach of a GIB should
be evaluated in what they’re trying to do in the market and
not just by leverage.
Some of the folks we mentioned earlier in the Green
Bank Network have been trying to collect their collective impact in their first, essentially, five years of operation. Essentially, there’s been about $8 billion invested or
committed. That brings projects to market in the amount
of about $26 billion. And there’s a wide variety of investments in renewables and efficiency and things like batteries, which are very innovative here.
These are starting to come in now and there are challenges in really making the data apples-to-apples and
understanding things like leverage, how we should think
about leverage. This is all part of what the Green Bank
Network is working on to figure out how to measure our
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actual progress in bringing in private capital in ways that
are transforming the market.
There are examples of civic transactions that have been
done by some of these GIBs. If you look at Malaysia,
which, again, is an emerging economy, the banks there
want to get involved in this space but have difficulty doing
so. Therefore, Malaysia has deployed a specific sort of subsidy program that really isn’t typical for most GIBs. It is a
straight-up subsidy. But the goal is to increase financing
at a lower financing cost to really get the market going.
So, their scheme is to provide a government guarantee
that is a kind of classic bilateral-type device or sovereign
device, 50% of financing provided by financial institutions
in Malaysia, local banks, plus a rebate on interest of 2%.
There’s going to be a savings to the end-user as well. As a
result, as of last year, they’ve funded 248 projects, primarily renewables—80% of those have been renewable energy,
solar, and biomass—and also in water. They brought a lot
of new investors into the space. Twenty-seven banks and
other institutions that would not have invested, invested
because of the program.
In Japan, there’s a real need to facilitate loan financing for developers by decreasing debt-to-equity ratio. That
means that if a project costs $100 and 80% of that needs
to be provided by debt and 20% by equity, the 20% that
the local developer has to provide is provided instead by
the GIB. By doing that, the GIB actually brings more debt
into the market. It also allows it to share managerial skills
with the management of the small developer to help them
do projects more efficiently going forward.
The U.K., as mentioned, looked at the offshore wind
sector. Essentially, the U.K. had a couple different goals.
They wanted to bring new investors into the sector and they
wanted to allow the existing investors that were mainly in
Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia to be able to
exit their investments because there wasn’t a lot of liquidity in the market to get out of these investments. So, they
invested first in operating wind projects. Then, they went
upstream to invest in wind projects. Then, they created the
first offshore wind fund. That fund allowed them to attract
pension funds that otherwise wouldn’t have invested in
this area. Again, that line of investments created a valuable
asset that the U.K. has now monetized in privatization.
In Australia, the green bond market really tries to get
bond investors with the biggest pool of capital in the world
into the green space by offering them investments that are
verified green investments. To get that market started in
Australia, the Australian Cooperative Finance Corporation has done some really interesting investments in what
is called “cornerstone investments” to really catalyze these
markets. A particular one was in solar and storage projects that have never been done before, so it was deemed as
being risky.
There is some really interesting work in Connecticut
around solar. Activating solar in Connecticut where the
GIB in the state offered direct loans to customers that
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were actually sized based on the amount of energy savings
that the projects would yield, which is also very innovative and has now been taken up by other actors in the
market in that market transformation measure that we
talked about earlier.
There are several ways to create a GIB. There are four
steps. First is figuring out what the market needs by scoping out what the barriers are to initial investment and by
meeting stakeholders. Second is analyzing and investigating in more depth. Third is figuring out the legal structure
and putting it in place. Then, fourth, is operations. The
Green Bank Network is looking to expand, and we’re hoping that we can get some emerging markets and some of
the new GIBs in the United States to join us this year. We
think we’re going to be transformative both in the United
States and abroad in helping catalyze private investment.
Michael Gerrard: Now we’re going to hear from John Rousakis, who’s an environmental attorney with O’Melveny &
Myers. He represents private equity in financial, commercial, and industrial clients in transactions, litigation, and
regulatory compliance matters.
John Rousakis: Thank you, Michael. I’m going to expand
on a concept that both Charles and Doug mentioned, and
that’s greening finance. So, I’m not going to talk about
green finance. But there has been a lot of activity in the
field of greening finance over the past 10 years. I’ll focus
particularly on the private equity space.
When we talk about this, we’re talking about how institutional investors and others have attempted to ensure that
the companies they invest in are managed responsibly and
sustainably with an eye toward reducing carbon footprints,
with an eye toward reducing other environmental impacts
and minimizing environmental risks, and with sensitivity toward community concerns and needs. I want to talk
about where we came from, where we are now, and where
we’re going.
To give some context, this was driven by activity in the
EU over 10 years ago. It was a really active time in the EU in
terms of environmental legislation and other activity. The
Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, and the EU was very
active in implementing the Protocol in the 2000s through
the Emissions Trading System. In the mid-2000s, they
passed the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and
Restriction of Chemicals Regulation (REACH), the Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE),
and the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive
(RoHS),15 which focused on product stewardship.
These rules sought to reduce carbon emissions and green
the supply chain. In the private sector, companies like
Walmart, General Electric, Hewlett Packard, and Apple
were also looking to green their supply chains, and were
15. REACH, Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 18 December 2006 Concerning the Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals; WEEE, Directive 2002/96/EC, amended as Directive 2012/19/EU; RoHS, Directive
2002/95/EC, amended as Directive 2011/65/EU.
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powerful in the sense that “we have these suppliers and
we can influence them or we can do a lot of environmental good by basically imposing certain environmental and
social standards on their activities.”
So, institutional investors thought about that, too. In
2003, banks got together and drafted the Equator Principles that influenced project finance.16 In 2006, the United
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI)
were drafted. At the time, a handful of institution investors
signed on to the UN PRI. To give some perspective, now
there are 1,700 investors that are signed on to the UN PRI.
That represents $60 trillion in assets under management
that are under a framework or umbrella of responsible
investing. That’s huge and really transformative.
So what are these principles? I’ll name the first three
because they provide a good framework for what we’re
going to discuss. The first one is that we will incorporate
ESG issues into investment analysis and decisionmaking
processes. That is diligence. That’s something we’ve done
and it’s been enhanced in the past few years. The second
one is we will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues
into our ownership policies and practices. That is implementation. What do we do when we buy a company and
how do we implement these ESG goals? The third is we
will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. That’s reporting. What do we tell
the world about what we’re doing? There’s a lot of discussion about whether or not public companies are doing
that appropriately and sufficiently. Although, in the private equity space they’re not required to report publicly,
there’s some discussion about how much they should be
required to report publicly as opposed to just to their limited partners.
A private equity general partner sets up the fund and
raises money for that fund. And then, limited partners,
institutional investors, pension funds, sovereign wealth
funds, and other investors put their money in the fund for
10 to 14 years or so. In that period, the private equity firm
invests, buys companies, holds them for a while and manages them, and sells them.
Right now, in terms of the assets under management for
private equity, we’re talking about several trillion dollars
of assets. So a significant portion of those assets are now
under this ESG umbrella.
Initially, when the UN PRI first came into effect, the
process was more one of self-assessment. Limited partners
essentially asked their general partners to report on what
they were doing in terms of evaluating ESG risks and what
they were doing to improve performance in that regard.
It was more of a self-assessment framework. It was looser.
Over time, it’s become more rigorous and comprehensive. Now, we have an effort to really dig more deeply into
how the performance of companies can be improved from
an environmental perspective and analyze what kinds of
opportunities exist for cost savings and for actually capi16. Equator Principles, http://equator-principles.com/ (last visited Mar. 26,
2018).

5-2018

talizing on, for example, opportunities in climate change
adaptation and carbon reduction.
Another thing that was driving this in the 2000s was
that we had the financial crisis. There were a lot of companies looking to save money, so they got pretty serious about
energy savings. There were opportunities to cut costs, and
there were grants being provided by state and federal governments for energy savings. So a lot of corporate America
saw this as a way to improve their bottom line and also
potentially get some public funding for it.
In 2009, the Private Equity Growth Capital Council—
now called the American Investment Council—drew up
their own guidelines for responsible investments that reflect
most of what were in the UN PRI. They committed to
incorporate these types of principles into their investments
as well. Examples of the types of issues and questions that
are incorporated into the frameworks include, for example,
diligence. Due diligence process and scope-type questions.
Whether or not portfolio companies have ESG policies.
How do you implement these policies? What actions have
companies taken to incorporate ESG into operations? And
what impacts have those ESG programs had on the companies’ financials and their communities?
In terms of diligence, as you can imagine, we’ve always
done diligence on companies and we’ve done deep environmental diligence. We do this to understand what risks are
associated with investments. Now, we’re sort of evolving to
look more toward carbon and climate change-related risks
in diligence. We have banks asking us questions about climate change risks associated with a business, such as flood
risks. These are things we’re asking companies. We’re asking companies what kind of sustainability programs they
have and whether or not they have evaluated their climate
change-related risks. It’s getting challenging, but we’re
starting to develop deeper evaluative diligence tools to figure this out.
For example, some of the challenges relate to evaluating
whether or not a company has a deep supply chain risk,
how water-dependent the company is, and whether or not
their suppliers will be able to supply them in the event of a
climate catastrophe or flood or storm or other major event.
So, that’s an evolving area. It’s particularly challenging as
diligence often is abbreviated in transactions.
There’s been a significant evolution over the past 10 years
in terms of implementation. Ten years ago, firms had not
necessarily staffed up to help portfolio companies implement the types of ESG programs that are now expected,
and there’s a wide range of sophistication in terms of implementing these types of programs. So, you have your large
private equity firms that have staffed up considerably and
have good-sized staffs and programs and actually go into
their portfolio companies and help them identify environmental risks and find environmental opportunities.
For example, we’ve seen a large private equity firm bring
together all their portfolio companies in one place to share
best practices and to raise the level of sophistication of
the smaller companies. Eighty-one percent of S&P 500
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companies now report on sustainability. There’s variation
in how informative the information they provide is, but
it’s generally accepted now that a big company will think
about this stuff and tell the world what it’s doing to reduce
its carbon footprint, to improve its environmental performance, and be sensitive to social needs.
When you get down to the smaller and mid-cap companies, it’s not something they’re necessarily thinking about.
So, I think what’s happened in the private equity space is
that you have information-sharing and you have the bigger
companies influence the level of performance of the smaller
and mid-cap companies just through an information-sharing process and by subjecting them to the rigors of an ESG
framework that has been imposed by the limited partners
and through the PRI-type framework.
We also see environmental consultants being used to
evaluate the environmental and social performance at companies. Limited partners will see that and recognize that as
a sign that there’s a fairly high level of interest and concern
at a company. That’s a good sign to them.
Moving on to the next topic: reporting and disclosure.
Under the private equity framework, the general partners
are required to report on their ESG performance to their
limited partners generally on an annual basis. There’s been
a bit of pressure for private equity to report in the way
that public companies report. It’s not necessarily going to
happen, although some private equity firms do some public reporting. I believe KKR does. But for the most part,
mid-sized and smaller private equity firms especially don’t
do a lot of reporting. But the substance of ESG reporting is interesting because we’re seeing a movement to be
more specific in terms of reporting, whether it’s privately
or publicly.
The SASB, which Charles mentioned, is developing specific metrics for reporting. The SASB has now developed
79 industry standards for reporting. What they’ve done,
because this stuff has been so vague in a lot of ways, is
they’ve developed standards for various industries but they
kept it pretty tight. For each industry, they’ve developed
about five disclosure topics and 13 metrics. Not hundreds.
Not dozens. So, when you’re looking at an industry, they’ve
sort of focused in on what might be material to evaluating
a company. They are now pushing that as a standard for
public disclosure of environmental and social risks.
So, the big picture is that there’s been a major cultural
transformation over the past 10 years in terms of how seriously companies take sustainability, and how deeply they
go into their operations to figure out risks and opportunities on the environmental and social side. When you
think about this, especially in the financial world and in
the private equity world, these aren’t necessarily people
you would have thought 20 years ago would have sensitivity toward these issues. There has absolutely been a much
higher level of sensitivity, particularly at the large private
equity firms. It’s become part of their DNA. It has been
pushed onto companies based initially on pressure from
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limited partners, and now it’s become sort of embedded in
the culture.
Michael Gerrard: We now have time for questions. First,
is a question from the audience. How is the green bond
market in the U.S.?
Charles Di Leva: All I could say to that is at least the
World Bank is very successful in selling green bonds,
including into the U.S. market. Last year, I think, was the
largest volume that they’ve ever sold, I think about $9 billion. So, for those following the green bond market, I think
it’s interesting to look at the International Capital Market
Association (ICMA) because they’ve set out principles for
green bonds. When you go to their site, you can actually
look at third-party auditor reviews of the different green
bond projects that have been financed.
So, to the extent that groups like ICMA and the World
Bank are publishing data on the different projects, we’ll
start to see a more transparent and a more robust market
for green bonds. I think that, at least in my experience
within the World Bank Group, for both the private-sector
side and the public-sector side, there’s a lot of optimism
and a lot of support for moving ahead on green bonds.
Michael Gerrard: The next question for the panelists is:
do you have recommendations or websites for individuals
who want to invest in green banking?
Douglass Sims: There’s the Green Bank Network at
greenbanknetwork.org. It’s the organization that has the
most information about GIBs. They’re currently given an
opportunity to invest in the GIBs themselves generally
because they are publicly owned institutions. There are of
course transactions where the GIBs co-invest with private
investors, so you can maybe invest in transactions that
they’re involved in. I think the New York Green Bank in
particular has an open request for proposal process that
is interesting to explore, about the opportunity to invest
with New York Green Bank. Their website is greenbank.
ny.gov. But greenbanknetwork.org is the place to start for
GIB information.
Michael Gerrard: We have a question about the privatization of the U.K. GIB. Why did that happen and is that
applicable in other places?
Douglass Sims: I should emphasize that it was not without extreme controversy and it wasn’t, as far as I’m aware,
the initial plan with the institution. It was a decision that
was made by the government to do so at a certain time,
but I think what enabled it was the fact that the return
targets that it had were essentially market returns. So,
now with the thing done, mostly it demonstrates that the
investments that it was making could be replicated by the
private markets without a lot of alteration. That was sort of
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the strategy and the goal, to be as near as possible to the
market, and that made it attractive to them.
You can imagine an institution that targeted different
kinds of goals. If it had a lower return portfolio, it wouldn’t
be attractive. Is it a pathway for other green banks? I think
to some extent. It depends. I think some of them are not
set up to be privatized. I think many of them aren’t selling
portfolios, which is essentially just debt trading. It’s on the
portfolio of projects that Connecticut has done. So, institutionally I don’t know if we’ll see more of that, if it’s good
or bad. But I think that we are certainly seeing portfolio
sales of GIB assets to private actors, and co-investments
and other kinds of innovative public-private partnerships
as it were.
Michael Gerrard: Let me ask a question. To what extent
in the United States is the difficulty in getting financing
a constraint on the construction of new renewable energy
facilities? Is it the case that any renewable energy facility
that has a viable economic model and likely has purchasers
for its power is likely to be able to find the money for it,
or is lack of financing a constraint? Any thoughts on that?
Charles Di Leva: I’ll comment on how the U.K. was able
to move forward with privatization. I think that the private market gets the incentive through the legal or regulatory change. So, the U.K. has some pretty strong climate
change legislation. Of course, they’re part of the EU’s commitment through Paris. So, you can privatize when you’re
pretty clear that the market is getting the signals from the
policy side.
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In the United States now, in the current situation, we’ll
probably get a fragmented approach where you have some
smaller banks in California and New York and other states
looking to move forward. Just in D.C. recently is an interesting proposal to price carbon. So, if we have these kinds
of measures, it’s probably going to help the private sector
see that there’s the incentive to start using their capital
because they’ll know about the greater sense of return.
Douglass Sims: Also in D.C., as you mentioned, there’s
a thought to do a city-based GIB. But on the question of
can you close financing gaps, I think there’s no one answer
to that question. I will say that we’re seeing, not just in the
United States, that the cost of renewable energy has really
reached grid parity in some places—certainly in the wind
sector there are some federal signals on the production tax
credit, and things like that.
But there’s an increasing number of cases where good
parity has been reached and people are looking at what
we call merchant risks. I mean most projects need what’s
called a power purchase agreement, a long-term purchase
agreement to support financing. But in some places,
increasingly, there’s people willing to just take market
prices on power and take a bet on the trend of the market.
So, we’ll see more of that as prices come down, assuming
that demand for energy holds up.
Charles Di Leva: I think one of the concerns is maybe the
price will come down too much, but that’s another story.
That would probably be a happy story.
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